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"The purposes of the United Nations are:
1. To maintain international peace and security (...)
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect
for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples

(. .

3. To achieve international co-operation in solving international
problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human
rights (..
(UN Charter, Article 1)
What is the use of international law?' Answering this apparently
simple question that we put to the members of the European Society of
Professor, Universitd Paris I-Pantheon Sorbonne.
I.
This Essay is a more in-depth version of a presentation made at the Conference of
the European Society of International Law at the Universitd Paris I in May 2006 (See Select
Proceedings of the European Society of International Law, vol. I, 2006, (Emmanuelle Jouannet, H6l ne Ruiz Fabri and Vincent Tomkiewics, forthcoming May 2008). It has also been
substantially modified, and I would like to extend my gratitude to the following colleagues
who took the time to exchange some of their ideas with me: Michel Xifaras, Olivier Corten,
Andr6a Bianchi, H616ne Ruiz Fabri, Jean Marc Sorel, Martti Koskenniemi, Monique
Chemillier-Gendreau and Nathaniel Berman.
*
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International Law requires embarking on an interpretative quest of great
magnitude, the main aspects of which I would like to sketch out here.
This preliminary inquiry is not limited to current representations of
modern-day international law including governance, networks, fragmentation, globalization, linkage or constitutionalization. Rather, these
phenomena are viewed as part of a wider tendency which has characterized modern international law for at least a century. Further, this work
suggests that certain concepts, such as that of "crisis," that lead us to
mistake the emergence of new techniques of legal regulation for irreversible shortcomings, are inadequate.2
My thesis is that international law currently represents a welfaredriven and bio-political structuring mode for international society which
not only counterbalances liberal economic globalization, but also draws
from it. This inquiry offers a political interpretation of contemporary
international law to clarify its functioning and the effects of its legal rationality, as well as to answer the question of its efficacy. An evolution
has taken place for at least a century and has only attainted partial completion.3 It is the fruit of modernity that constantly projects its
aspirations, its unity, and its contradictions onto the international legal
system. At the outset of the 21st Century, this system has become a
guardian of welfare.
This inquiry essentially aims to provide a more differentiated vision
of international law, and thus to provide a better understanding of its
complex path. This reading of international law is intended to be prolific
enough to be reflected upon, all the while reconstituting international
law's meaning and making it problematic in fact. The only thing that
could have made me hesitate is that this thesis, and the term "law providence," can reinforce prejudices against international law and also create
a reactionary prophesy, can support simplified convictions, can create
misunderstandings, or can return to praise the resurrection of a strict or
ultra-liberal idea of international law. This last idea, which at the outset
appeared to me quite naive, rests on a mistake that I would like to show
concerning the evolution and significance of international law and that
will be a futile step in its principal. To make everything problematic, all
the while retracing this providential (beneficial) dimension of international law, does not mean that I do not wish to address the strictly liberal
ideas of law that have never existed so purely as these have. The obstacles and perverse effects that direct a providential law are those of an
2.
See JACQUES DONZELOT, LA POLICE DES FAMILLES 13 (2005). For a more indepth
discussion on the evolution of international law, see HtLhNE Ruiz FABRI, LE DROIT DANS LES
RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES, 65 Politique Etrangire 660 (2000).
3.
See ANTOINE GARAPON, LE GARDIEN DES PROMESSES 269 (1996).
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international law that is in reality liberal-providence like I am trying to
demonstrate; there is no way to avoid the difficulties that can arise when
measuring the risks without mortgaging the dualist principle.
I. AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

International law is organized to best enable it to attain its aims and
objectives, and it represents a compromise between the aims that different international actors seek to achieve through it. International law is
also the result of the State practice that has developed in response to the
various challenges confronted since 1945. This State practice's underlying welfare logic is particularly important to highlight. Further, many of
the foundational objectives of 1945 do not resolve conflicts between the
aims of the law, but rather conceive of conflicts as part of the rule of law.
A. The Objectives of the United Nations Charter:Material Law!
Formal Law and the Problem of Conflict
One encounters difficulties today when trying to analyze the general
objectives that emanate from the enthusiasm and consensus of 1945.
How should we interpret them considering how general they are and how
much the world has changed?' Everyone agrees that international law
should promote peace, justice, economic development, and human
rights, and combat world poverty. But notwithstanding the validity of
these very general postulates and the apparent suitability of international
law as a means to pursue them, there is little consensus on how to use
the law to this effect. The law needs to promote peace, but does this
mean absence of war, or harmonious development of different human societies? Are human rights norms compatible with the laws of Islamic
States or Asian values? Is justice achieved by reconciliatory pardoning of
faults committed, or by punishing guilty individuals in international criminal courts? The legal objectives defined by the members of international
society are so general and abstract that they leave room for endless conflicts. Thierry de Montbrial suggested that a very similar problem arose
in relation to the grand abstract ideas of equality and liberty that drove
the French Revolution. As indicated by Albert Sorel in L'Europe et la
Rvolution fran~aise:
The principles of the French Revolution were abstract and universal, which is why they found wide endorsement so easily; but that
is also why they carried such different consequences depending
4.
See generally
326 (2007).

MARTTI

KOSKENNIEMI, LA POLITIQUE DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL
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on the social environment which adopted them. It is only in the
consciousness of the philosopher that these grand ideas conserve
their metaphysical purity ... Whoever applies them, identifies
with them, makes them his own, merely denaturises them.5
The same can be said of the principal aims and objectives of contemporary international law laid down in the Charter, which are so abstract that
they contain an incredible degree of indeterminacy and leave an impressive margin of appreciation. Denaturization is never a distant prospect.
Of course, differences in State opinion are nothing new when it comes to
the interpretation of the Charter, and are a perfectly natural occurrence in
our decentralized system. As has been observed by Martti Koskenniemi,
governments, professionals and other actors should be engaged in discussion and even in disputes over the aims and objectives of the law.
This is an ordinary and necessary aspect of a lively and pluralist society
of States and other actors intent on fathoming the content of their legal
commitments.
Yet it seems necessary to go further still and to realize that the law
has become more contradictory by reason of the substantial objectives
defined by the Charter. It is precisely because the legal principles and
objectives are substantive, and not just formal, that they create endless
conflict. The communal aspect of post-war international law lies in the
formal secondary rules of creation and of conflict-resolution, while the
substantive primary rules are prone to conflict. The Charter represents a
further step in a development that originated in the League of Nations
and the interwar period, as a result of which substantive law, not formal
law, now forms the basis of the international legal system. This represents a switch in priorities. The inability of European nations to agree on
a definition of common interest (in particular common religious interest)
in the 16th and 17th centuries prompted these nations to favour a liberal,
classical, voluntary law of nations in which agreements were governed
by a set of purely formal rules based on cooperation and respect for sovereignty. These rules applied to all States without subjecting any of them
to anything substantial; they merely prescribed equality and trade reciprocity, and resolved disputes. The substantive objectives defined in the
1945 Charter and the legal values they convey work in the opposite
manner. Their effect is to instil conflict in international law and not
merely to enable conflict resolution.'
5.
See ALBERT SOREL, L'EUROPE ET LA RtVOLUTION FRAN(AISE (Plon-Nourrit et Cie
ed. 1904), quoted in THIERRY DE MONTBRIAL, L'ACTION ET LE SYSTtME DU MONDE 394
(2002).
6.
KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 4, at 322.
7.
See FRANCOIS EWALD, L'ETAT-PROVIDENCE 513-17 (Bernard Gasset ed., 1986).
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Observers often point out the return to substantive law, but have seldom systematically theorized the implications of this new tendency. One
can, however, make out a number of decisive consequences, as discussed
below.
First, conflict is no longer situated outside the law, but lies within
substantive law itself. There was no social contract in 1945, just as there
was none in 1918, but rather there was a provisional consensus which
made it possible to define the legal values and aims to be achieved by
international society at that precise moment. The objectives laid down in
the Charter were never entrenched from the onset and have been reinterpreted numerous times, as the true content of values can never be set in
stone. This explains why interpretational conflict is an everyday part of
international politics, a means of developing objectives which may appear consensual, but which are actually constantly renegotiated. This
perspective should lead us to re-evaluate the recurrent idea of "crisis" in
contemporary international law, and to appreciate it in the context of this
development. International law is affected by an inevitable and endogenous "continuous crisis," which renders it instable, albeit not in an
alarming or singular manner. This is a logical effect of the law's substantive nature. 8
Second, the law itself has become an object of conflict. It has become a weapon of choice, an instrument of assertion, a strategic stake.
International law is no longer simply a means of limiting State behavior,
but is a tool in the hands of States and has become an instrument for the
defence of any position. Instrumentalism, often associated with a pragmatic Anglo-Saxon attitude, is now a largely generalized phenomenon
favouring the shift toward a more substantive international law.
Third, we are currently going through a "universality crisis." 9 Practices within international law have changed to accommodate new
substantive objectives that no longer merely define a framework within
which sovereignties are juxtaposed, but also define a common interest
based on universality. Yet just as in 16th and 17th century Europe, actors
still have their own ways of conceiving of common and universal interests, and one's partners' contrary conceptions are generally perceived as
strange and imperialist. It is therefore normal that we should be going
through a "universality crisis" as a result of these differences in conceptions.
Fourth, the practice of consensus has become prevalent. The fact that
international law is more prone to conflict and is enduring a "universality
8.
Conversely, although I will not elaborate on the point here, the law can suffer exogenous shocks which can cause "crises" that are all the worse.
9.
See generally MIREILLE DELMAS-MARTY, LE RELATIF ET L'UNIVERSEL (2004).
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crisis" does not mean that international society has become more selfcontradictory. Its actors have adapted, finding balances between their
respective rights and reaching compromises by means of mutual interpretative concessions. The practice of consensus decision-making is
characteristic of this development, as it enables the achievement of
"agreement within disagreement."' 0
Finally, we are witnessing a "moralisation of law." If law is acquiring substantive objectives, if it incamates values, this means that the
boundaries between law and morality are becoming more difficult to
discern." Moral values are being translated into legal principles, and the
distinction between law and morality is now merely a matter of degree
and not of nature. It is, for example, characteristic that the "right of intervention" can now easily be invoked as a "duty to intervene," and that
war is once again becoming an instrument of ethical intervention.'" This
is precisely the reason why early international jurists, from Grotius to
Vattel, spent two centuries attempting to desubstantivize international
law, and the law of war in particular. The idea of just war, and the accompanying notion of just cause, caused too much conflict and were
abandoned by these authors in favor of a set of purely formal rules governing the recourse to war.
Despite the return to a substantive law paradigm, international society is much less developed than are domestic societies. An international
civil society is only just emerging, and world public opinion is a shaky
concept often controlled by interest groups. This creates a risk that that
the society will not be sufficiently concerned with its future, especially if
the same group of legal entities remains engaged in a repetitive quarrel
about the objectives of the Charter. The quarrel is healthy, yet somehow
sterile, as it cannot prompt a more radical debate on the future of international law. The truly decisive question we should attempt to answer is
that of where the law is heading and what its trajectory should be. In
other words, which are the substantive principles that have managed to
10.
11.

EWALD, supra note 7, at 516.

See generally STANLEY

HOFFMANN, DUTIES BEYOND BORDERS: ON THE LIMITS

AND POSSIBILITIES OF ETHICAL INTERNATIONAL
TURES)

POLITICS (THE FRANK W. ABRAMS LEC-

(1981); TRADITIONS OF INTERNATIONAL ETHICS (Terry Nardin & David R Mapel eds.,

1992).
12.

See MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 86-108 (1992); see also JAMES
TURNER JOHNSON, Threats, Values, and Defense: Does the Defense of Values by Force Remain
a Moral Possibility?, in JUST WAR THEORY 55, 55-60 (Jean Bethke Elshtain ed., 1991); see
also GENE M. LYONS & MICHAEL MASTANDUNO, State Sovereignty and InternationalIntervention: Reflections on the Present and Prospects for the Future, in BEYOND WESTPHALIA?
STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION 250, 260-65 (Gene M. Lyons &
Michael Mastanduno eds., 1995);
LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL MENACE

OLIVIER CORTEN, LE RETOUR DES GUERRES PREVENTIVES"

12 (2003);

MARIO BETTATI, LE DROIT D'ING9RENCE: MU-

TATION DE L'ORDRE INTERNATIONAL 89-100 (1996).
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prevail in legal technique and practice despite being a source of controversy, and which of these have helped create new, modern-day power
and knowledge structures?
B. The Emergence of Welfare-Inducing InternationalLaw

Contemporary international law has seen increasing use since
1945-though its general use can be traced back to the end of the 19th
century-with the aim of resolving the more traditional problems regarding peaceful coexistence of States, but also to address and tackle new
issues like safeguarding rights of the human person, market imperatives,
and protecting and assuring the well-being of the world population. Contemporary international law's current trajectory is complex and is the
product of international practices aimed at tackling the problems the international society faced after the war, and which have today attained a
certain coherence and intelligibility. These practices have marked a considerable change in international legal activity. Its objective is not only to
maintain peace between States, but to protect the lives of individuals,
their liberty, their health, their education, and their sanitary well being.
Mindful of these objectives, international law is now primarily a
guardian of welfare. Just as liberal European States have become welfare
States at a domestic level, contemporary international law evolved from
a liberal law with a limited role of regulating essential co-existential issues into a multifunctional guardian of welfare governing the lives of
States and individuals.' It is widely considered the ultimate guarantor of
collective wellbeing. International law is no longer merely a means of
social regulation, but is becoming an instrument of intervention; it is being used to transform international society in order to make up for
economic, social, or equitable imbalances. Further, it represents a new
mode of exercising power, since it requires putting specific regulatory
techniques and practices in place. The aim is not, of course, to foster an
insurance-orientated international law capable of developing riskmanagement techniques on the basis of indemnity or social security,
much as certain States have done. Rather, the emergence of a welfareinducing international law, incomplete as it may be, possesses several
interventionist finalities aimed at the solution of international problems
13.
The expression "welfare-inducing international law" obviously needs to be nuanced
because it does not represent a direct transposition of the concept of the welfare State as it
exists at a domestic level. There are certain parallels with the welfare State in as far as multiinterventionism and the substantive nature of the law are concerned, and also to the extent that
both concepts aim at social progress. In these respects, the analogy can actually be very helpful. But we are far less concerned, here, with the principles of solidarity and redistribution
which have been so characteristic of the welfare State. See generally PIERRE ROSANVALLON,
LA CRISE DE L'TAT-PROVIDENCE (2d ed. 1992).
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of economic, social, intellectual or humanitarian nature. The legal interventionism that has characterized this development has a wide scope,
and even the meaning of legal intervention is changing drastically. 4 This
interventionism extends beyond mere "intervention" in a military or
emergency response sense. It actually corresponds to the omnidirectional expansion that has characterized the development of international law and which has recently contributed to revalorizing it by
making it humanist and welfare-inducing.
Another recent change in international law is its transformation into
a policing instrument to safeguard the world population. This policing
aspect does not imply that law has an essentially repressive function, but
rather corresponds to the impact of certain treaties of the 18th and 19th
century, the aim of which was to "keep watch over" society. 5 This conception was also reflected in the views of Vattel and Wolff at the time.
Michel Foucault attributes a particular sense to this notion of policing at
a domestic level, and demonstrates how it can evolve into a biocompetency.' 6 According to this author, one of the fundamental traits of
the modern State lies in its ability to exercise power over the lives, the
safety, the health and morality of its population, to the extent that these
bio-politics, which focus more on life than on liberty, fuel the development of welfare-inducing law.
A similar bio-competency may be developing at an international
level.' 7 One can certainly affirm the onset of a proliferation of rules
aimed at promoting health, a balanced diet, adequate lodging, acceptable
living conditions, or controlling global warming.'8 Development implies
freedom from dependency as well as being a liberty in its own right.
These rules also deal with the relationship between man and nature, his

14.

MICHEL VAN DE KERCHOVE & FRANgOIS OST, LE SYSTEME JURIDIQUE ENTRE OR-

165 (1988).
15.
"Policing aims at guaranteeing the wellbeing of the State by means of appropriate
legislation and by empowering and invigorating it to the greatest extent possible. The science
of policing consists in regulating all things pertaining to the present state of society, in consolidating and improving it, and in assuring the wellbeing of all its members." JOHANN
HEINRICH GOTTLOB VON JUSTI, tF1ments Genirauxde Police (Rozet 1769), quoted in DONZELOT, supra note 2, at 12. See also PAOLO NAPOLI, NAISSANCE DE LA POLICE MODERNE:
POUVOIR, NORMS, SOCItTt (2003).
DRE ET DISORDRE

16.
See MICHEL FOUCAULT, NAISSANCE DE LA BIOPOLITIQUE: COURs Au COLLEGE DE
FRANCE (2004); see also MICHEL FOUCAULT, HISTOIRE DE LA SEXUALITt: LA VOLONTt DE

SAVOIR (1976).
17.
See also MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NtGRI, EMPIRE 46 (2000) (defending the
idea of Empire with out imperialism); ATILIO A. BORON, EMPIRE & IMPERIALISME 30-31
(Marie-Anne Dubosc trans., 2003) (explaining that notion of "bio-competency" invented by
Foucault is in reality a dated notion).
18.
See FOUCAULT supra note 16, at 16.
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surroundings and the environment.' 9 In addition, the idea of safety has
grown from the idea of sovereignty, and has, within this proliferation of
institutions, rules and practices of welfare-inducing international law,
become the legal instrument par excellence. ° Various threats, including
security, environmental, social, and sanitation threats, have become considerable accelerators of this tendency, because they lead international
actors to think about social interconnections in collective terms and to
form what Jurgen Habermas called an "involuntary community of
risks., 2 1The law now aims not only at protecting individual States from
aggression from other States, but also at managing collective risks and
threats and the way in which individuals, populations, and States regulate their lives, since the life of any given man, population, or State is
henceforth considered to be a risk factor for others. As Ulrich Beck
suggests, 23 this development touches the very core of modern domestic
societies and international society, which simultaneously recognize the
classical concept of "redistribution of riches" and the more modern "risk
redistribution" society.
It may seem odd that this type of law developed in a world dominated by economic globalization. However, the fact that contemporary
international law and its welfare-inducing aspects have developed in this
way does not mean that we have now completely abandoned the old liberal paradigm and have moved on to a new, exclusively welfare-inducing
model. Further, one would be mistaken to reduce the development of the
international legal order to a by-product of economic currents generated
by public and private transnational activities based on strictly liberal
regulation, competition, and non-intervention. In fact, the practices and
appearances of welfare-inducing law are perpetually influenced by the
classical, liberal practices from which it would appear so detached, and
even by current globalization practices. This has been supported by many
observers, albeit not necessarily on the basis of a political interpretation of
the sort I am proposing here, but in other, equally legitimate ways. Examples include reference to the subsistence of classical interstate structures
19.
See U.N. Conference on Env't and Dev., June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declarationon Env't
and Dev., annex I, princ. 1,U.N. Doc A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol.1) (Jan. 1993) ("Human
beings are at the centre of concerns for sustainable development. They are entitled to a healthy
and productive life in harmony with nature.").
20.
EWALD, supra note 7, at 375.
JORGEN HABERMAS, LE PROJET DE PAIX PERP12TUELLE: LE BICENTENAIRE D'UNE
21.
ID1E KANTIENNE 74 (Rainer Rochlitz trans., Le Cerf 1996).
EWALD, supra note 7, at 375.
22.
23.
ULRICH BECK, LA SOCI9T9 Du RISQUE: SUR LA VOIE D'UNE AUTRE 35-36 (Laure
Bernardi, trans., Flammarion 2001) (1986). The society of large-scale or collective risk cannot, however, be said to incarnate an altogether new model of modernity, since risk (be it
individual or large-scale) is, in any case, an aspect inherent to the welfare society, which is
based on a redistribution of riches and risk management.
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despite common finalities; the intersection of public law and the law of
public actors on the one hand, and private law and the law of private actors on the other; and the fragmentation of international law and attempts
at hierarchical stratification. The traditional distinction between public
international law and private transnational law has thus given way to an
intermingling of application areas, much in the same way as interrelationships between traditional actors, public actors, and private operators
have intensified as part of the same development.24
The international legal system is complex, and its evolution toward
an interventionist, welfare-inducing law is infused with liberal, formal
and private elements. There are various meanings to the idea of welfareinducing international law. More precisely, international law can be considered to be only residually welfare-inducing, as has been observed by
Titmuss," or can be perceived as welfare-inducing and liberal at once, as
maintained by Gosta Esping-Andersen.26
The phenomenon of socialization of the law does not necessarily coincide with an expansion of public international law to the detriment of
private transnational law. This does not need to be the case because interventionist legal practices can have a private contractual basis just as
much as they can be based on a multilateral public treaty, and can require action on the part of private actors as much as action on the part of
public actors. Take a few examples. The first concerns the implementation of the welfare-inducing and interventionist Kyoto Protocol. The a
priori objective of the Kyoto Protocol is only to limit State greenhouse
gas emissions, and therefore facially relies only on States. In reality,
however, successful implementation of the protocol depends on mobilization of the private sector, notably corporate action, as well as action
taken pursuant to the Protocol's two flexibility mechanisms: the clean
development mechanism (CDM) and the mechanism for joint implemen-

24.
For examples, see Philip Alston, The Myopia of the Handmaidens: International
Lawyers and Globalization, 8 EUROPEAN J. INT'L LAW 435-48(1997); Gunther Teubner,
Global Bukovina: Legal Pluralism in the World Society, in GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE
3-28 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997); Oren Perez, Normative Creativity and Global Legal Pluralism: Reflections on the Democratic Critique of Transnational Law 10 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 25 (2003); Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner, Regime-Collisions:
The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L
999; Paul Stephan, The New International Law-Legitimacy, Accountability, Authority, and
Freedom in the New Global Order, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1555 (1999).
25.
See RICHARD TITMUSS, COMMITMENT TO WELFARE 124 (1968).
26.
See GOSTA ESPING-ANDERSEN, LEs TRois MONDES DE L'ETAT-PROVIDENCE 62
(1999) ("The fact that liberalism has warmed to social protection demonstrates that liberal
practice is suppler than one thinks, which can be explained by the fact that under certain conditions, social protection can help consolidate the commercialisation of work without causing
undesirable social effects.").
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tation (JI) which enables the Compliance Committee to cooperate with
private actors (and especially with NGOs).
There are other examples of transnational efforts to legally and politically recognize health as a "world public interest" through public
private action. The global struggle against malaria is a clear example.
ASAQ is a new drug against malaria, a disease that kills over a million
people in the most impoverished countries each year. It was released for
sale on March 1, 2007, and is sold for a dollar a packet. Thanks to an
extremely dynamic network of public and private actors consisting of
NGOs, private foundations, pharmaceutical laboratories, public universities and UN agencies, it is marketed without any trademark. One is thus
confronted with a process that defies legal compartmentalization and
categorization. This cooperative effort between the public and private
spheres demonstrates how the development of international law can be
viewed in terms of welfare inducement.
It would be short-sighted to associate the liberal side of international
law with private law and welfare-inducing international law with public
international law. Such a view is corroborated neither by history nor by
current developments, and entails interpreting the term "liberal" in a
purely economic sense. The two models are superposed, and the interventionism inherent in welfare-inducing law favors the proliferation of
operators, norms, and fields of intervention. Since international law has
not yet seen true unification and centralization of political interests (an
aspect that could also be said to be illusory in domestic systems), welfare-inducing law brings together various dispersed, specialized, and
even contradictory policies and practices often driven by opposing interests.
Furthermore, welfare-inducing practices stimulate economic globalization to the extent that the latter represents a paradoxical motor of
welfare-inducement: globalization driven to extremes prompts resistance
and a need for corrections and adaptations by means of the law. It is fascinating to observe that something very similar already occurred during
the first large pre-1914 wave of economic globalization, which coincided
with colonization. Suzanne Berger described that the early domestic
foundations for the welfare State were laid in this period when laws on
accidents at work and on working time were put in place. 27 The author
demonstrates very succinctly that this initial globalization certainly did
not come in the way of distributive principles and social democracy and
that it spawned these developments.28 Michael Foucault, for his part, has
27.

SUZANNE BERGER, NOTRE PREMIERE MONDIALISATION: LEMONS D'UN ECHEC OU-

BLIE 78 (2003).

28.

Id. at 79.
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analysed how bio-politics aimed at the protection of a population's
health and environment have always required a liberal society. 9 Last but
not least, developments of this sort can also be analysed in terms of the
evolution of liberal and humanist individualism, as illustrated by Marcel
Gauchet. ° As a result of the gradual differentiation between collectives
such as States and peoples, and of a truly constructive endeavour undertaken by concrete individuals in Western societies on the basis of
abstract conceptions of the individual, the individual has increasingly
become a central preoccupation for international society. There is a tendency toward attributing a substantive meaning to the liberty of the
individual according to the means available to protect it. In particular,
the rights and liberties of individuals have been enhanced by virtue of
the improvements made to collective conditions. Seen in this way, welfare-inducing law can be perceived as a confirmation and not as a
rejection of liberal principles. The norms and institutions of international
law now remedy deficiencies and difficulties that formerly seemed to
affect States and individuals separately, and which therefore called for
personal or national remedies. These are, however, difficulties and problems the external effects of which have been known for a long time, and
which are at the origins of the ideas of collective "detriment" or "good."
To appreciate the evolution toward welfare-inducement under international law, it is necessary to reinterpret the objectives and principles of
contemporary law as it developed concurrent with changes in political,
economic and social history. Liberal western democracies had a profound influence on contemporary international law and instilled in it a
certain legal ethnocentrism. Though the objectives of the Charter that
emerged in 1945 are currently a source of controversy, they are in fact
the product of a process that spanned several centuries. Western social
policies crystallized at a domestic and international level in the course of
the 20th century, when the failure of classical liberal conceptions of liberty (and of sovereignty) became apparent and industrial and postindustrial capitalism increasingly gave rise to problems. In a way, it is
the same trauma that has afflicted the domestic and international spheres,
triggered by the realization that individual liberty and State sovereignty
do not, when condemned to negative forms of coexistence, bring about
improvement but make things worse. Cooperation and solidarity require
alternative practices inspired by these experiences and by the progress of
social sciences. The debate has been ongoing in Europe and in the
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United States ever since the emergence of solidarist doctrines, but only
really surfaced at an international level in the wake of the First World
War. The idea of the League of Nations was defended by those who defended social laws in domestic systems, such as Georges Scelle, L6on
Bourgeois, Georges Gurvitch, and Maxime Leroy,3' the underlying
thought being that a solidarist society would be a "safeguard" against
war and would guarantee the wellbeing of all. This moment also marked
the birth of the ILO.
The Second World War did not put an end to this process, and from
1941 onwards, social security was declared an essential element of future international peace. In the Atlantic Charter, Roosevelt and Churchill
defined the forthcoming objectives of international society in the following terms:
To bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in
the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved
labor standards, economic advancement and social security (...)
(To) afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live
out their lives in freedom from fear and want (points 5 and 6).
The tenor of these objectives comes as no surprise. The Charter came
shortly after the introduction of the New Deal in the United States,
which was before the Second World War. In 1944, Freda Kirchwey proclaimed, "Only a worldwide, more expansive and consistent New Deal
can prevent a World War III.,,32 The European countries, for their part,
emerged from the war with a new, more social conception of democracy,
prepared to combat poverty and social misery in order to prevent another
breakdown of democracy. The western post-war democracies set out to
secure solidarity and full employment in a society based on free-market
capitalism. The famous Beveridge Report published in Britain in 1942
intended to "rid society of want and all major risks." In 1943, the CNR
(the French National Council of the Resistance) published a report in
which it deemed it necessary "to be protected against social risks by virtue of a regime based on foresight and assistance capable of abolishing

See generally L9ON BOURGEOIS, POUR LA SOCITt DES NATIONS (1910); LrON
(1919); GEORGES SCELLE, LE PACTE DES
NATIONS (1919); GEORGES SCELLE, L'ORGANISATION INTERNATIONALE DU TRAVAIL ET LE
B.I.T. (1930); MAXIME LEROY, L'IRE WILSON, LA SOCItT9 DES NATIONS (1917); GEORGES
GURVITCH, L'IDgE DU DROIT SOCIAL (1932); GEORGES GURVITCH, LE TEMPS PR9SENT ET
L'IDtE DU DROIT SOCIAL (1931), cited in EWALD, supra note 7, at 397.
32.
See Freda Kirchway, Program of Action, I I THE NATION 300 (1944). On extending
31.
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misery once and for all."" Indeed, it was Churchill, Roosevelt, and de
Gaulle who were to lay the foundations for the 1945 Charter and future
international society. It is natural that they should project their ideals onto
the future international legal system in addition to bringing about a realist
repartition of powers in the future Security Council and putting in place an
essentially liberal economic order by means of the Bretton Woods Agreements.34 Yet the evils the European countries and Roosevelt's America
aimed at eradicating in 1945 are largely the same ones international society faces today: war scars, disease, poverty and ignorance.
The emphasis after the Second World War on the liberties of individuals (and of peoples) as well as on the new economic and social
dimensions of the law indicated that these plights had "hollowed out
from within" a world that seemed not to care about them enough.35 In my
opinion, the apparent paradox of the objectives of contemporary international law (formal/substantive; liberty/wellbeing; civil rights/social
rights; State/people/individual) is the overall result of the historical development of western legal humanism in its liberal and conservative
form, in its initial individualist form, and in its eventual social, paternalist and solidarist, i.e. welfare-inducing form. This explains the current
dilemma of an international society no longer only confronted with the
issue of war and peace, but also torn between liberty and life; between
liberties and the economic, social and environmental wellbeing of the
planet; between market exigencies and imperatives of compassion.
The specific welfare-inducing law and bioethical power issues this
Essay addresses should not indicate partisanship or militancy, and do not
have the negative meanings that authors such as Foucault, Hardt, or
Negri attribute to them. That is, the development interpreted as welfareinducing, interventionist, and bio-political does not necessarily transform contemporary law into a steel cage that will imprison everything
and everyone as a global "Empire" takes its grip.36 On the contrary, the
terms employed in this essay are less radical, and describe practices
which are infinitely more ambivalent than the above authors suggest.
33.
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They aim to convey, in the most accurate way possible, what flows from
the observation of various existing legal practices related to socialising
processes and to illustrate the fact that, contrary to what certain authors
have been contending for a long time-and most notably since the failure of endeavours such as the New International Economic Order in the
1970s-that international law not only transports liberal values, but also
welfare-inducing and interventionist practices and values.37 Liberal wel-

fare-inducing law thus represents a new legal, political and economic
configuration at the international level, and not merely a liberal configuration.
C. Instrumental Logic and Common Principles:Internalization,
Fragmentationand Constitutionalization

The principal role of international law does still consist, of course, of
liberal regulation of conduct and of the resolution of conflict, aimed at
promoting coexistence of sovereign liberties. But besides its original
prescriptive and organizational roles, international law also fulfils a substantive, interventionist role. It governs domestic situations, reconstructs
States, promotes democracy, and addresses collective interests pertaining
to the environment, health, and culture. The result has been one of the
most important developments in contemporary international law: the
regulation not only of interstate relations, but also of domestic situations.
The fact that rules of international origin increasingly penetrate into
domestic systems is testimony to a post-1945 desire to regulate the conduct of private individuals or the conduct of States vis-t-vis their
subjects in addition to regulating relations that are strictly interstate. Although this decisive aspect no longer commands as much of international
lawyers' attention as it used to, the internalization of international law has
long-term implications for the definition of international law, as well as its
relationship with domestic law and the re-designation of our field of study,
as has been demonstrated by Jean Combacau.38 Moreover, as emphasised
by Gunther Teubner, Jean-Guy Belley, and Charles-Albert Morand,3 9 it is
Accordingly, it seems appropriate to nuance the overly liberal interpretations of
37.
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38.
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used for the attainment of specific objectives and to re-equilibrate economic, political, and social imbalances. The predominant economic
system is obviously not indifferent to this development since it is based
on a functionalist rationale, as are the ongoing commercialization and
legalization of the social relationships that are collateral to economic and
financial transactions.
The market and political economics therefore play an important role
in this context, but the way in which legal rationale is evolving is neither
a consequence nor an implication of these factors. The international legal
order has a natural tendency to decentralize and divide itself in accordance with the various different social and economic activities it
overarches. Another part of the explanation lies in the materialization of
the new initiators and co-creators of law together with whom the former
Secretary General of the United Nations aimed at formulating a Global
Compact, but it lies also in the emergence of that famous "involuntary
community of risks" referred to earlier. Law is resorted to in reaction to
risks and new threats, and often the available remedy is not of a general
nature, but a specific response. The propensity to seek legal remedies has
led to a legal regime that is attaining specificity and poignancy in a variety of sectors (the environment, crime, bioethics, etc.). International
society has become a society of law characterized not by a shift toward
world statehood, but by the emergence of different "pools of law. ' 4 Also,
the law has become a "social technique" through which a number of
profitable (economic) activities and environmental, investment, trade,
interstate, and individual rights-related problems are defined, managed,
and channelled in as coherent a way as possible.
Some observers have also remarked that international and transnational rules appear to be becoming a lot more mobile, variable, alterable.
They have become the immediate transposition of various substantive,
cultural, social, and economic objectives set by States and international
institutions as well as private operators. They convey a social consensus
achieved by these actors at a given moment in response to a given social
and political situation. In other words, what was formerly merely a
pragmatist and anti-conceptualist conception of law attributed to a strong
Anglo-American movement has actually become a reality of international law.
It thus comes as no surprise that the international legal structure is
now undergoing the same development that once characterized domestic
(1992). See also LARS D. ERIKSSON ET
(1998); FRANCOIS OST
& MICHEL VAN DE KERCHOVE, DE LA PYRAMIDE AU RESEAU? (2002).
40.
See JACQUES CHEVALLIER, L'ETAT POST-MODERNE 94 (2d ed. 2004).
STATE, LAW AND ECONOMY AS AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEMS
AL., INTRODUCTION:

A

POLYTICAL MANIFESTO, IN POLYCENTRICITY 1

Summer 2007]

What Is the Use of InternationalLaw?

systems: namely, that of a proliferation of legal aims and functions. This
follows an inflation of rules of hard law or soft law, of the bureaucratization of international relations by international institutions, and of the
increasingly technical nature of certain branches of international law, the
aims of which are very particular and precise.' In international law,
however, more so than in domestic law, legal rules proliferate because
existing texts are rarely abrogated. One convention, directive, resolution
or declaration follows the next, yet the formation of new rules does not
entail the disappearance of the old ones. Much uncertainty still surrounds the concepts of desuetude and caducity, wherefore the amount of
legal rules does not cease to increase. It is also revealing that the texts
are becoming ever longer, as they are now more exhaustive and technical. They are also increasingly numerated. The greater complexity and
detail of current rules derives from their sector-related specificity. Correspondingly, the legal prescriptions of rules now weigh more heavily.
New goals are emerging that are characteristic of a welfare-inducing society, backed by rules that are prospective and that act as an incitation
rather than a sanction. The impressive development by firms of codes of
best practice is a perfect example of this.42 Finally, there has been a noticeable change in the sources of law, as all that is practical, bilateral, or
singular is preferred to what is multilateral, and to modes of creation that
are too formal.
The increased number of sources and specificity of international law
lead to fragmentation, creating a multitude of specialized or regional
sub-systems. Conventions and legal texts are more and more often
specialized or regional in nature, sometimes extremely technical, and
aim to regulate social reality with the largest possible efficacy. In fact, a
characteristic aspect of this welfare-inducing development has been an
anarchic proliferation of rules destined to regulate many areas of social
life. This proliferation also produces incomplete and instable rules. Each
legal subsystem provides for its own particular responses and functions
in ways that satisfy very specific needs. The solutions offered by these
subsystems most often do not take into account common connections
with other fields. The subsystems are set up by conventions that have a
limited sphere of application, calibrated to the pursuit of a precise
substantive result. This makes them easier to conclude, and they are
necessary in that they enable international law to achieve its various
concrete, specialized, and technical aims that rely on the constant increase
41.
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42.
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in legal rules in international society. But they favour segmentation of
certain substantive areas to the detriment of the sum total, since
specialized rules are directed at the pursuit of immediate and particular
aims and not of general objectives. They thereby create the impression
that international law is structured in a fragmented and disorderly
manner, focussing on very particular economic, financial, environmental,
social, or other aims.
There is nothing novel in illustrating the effects of this rationale.
Substantive results are achieved in a functionalist manner and in ways
that satisfy immediate interests, by trumping the law that is deemed formal and without due consideration for the general collective interest,
with the consequence that the values to which these interests should be
naturally subordinate are ignored. International law is thus marked by a
new positivity and corresponds to a logic of efficiency. This extension
has been brought about by a welfare-inducing international society
which, although not a State, has its own somewhat uncoordinated and
uncontrolled way of dealing with technological developments, the surge
of capitalism, bureaucratic specialization, new adjacent security challenge, and the various new and social objectives defined by international
society itself. This new law is effective because it does not allow for
overly rigid or dogmatic conceptions of law, but rather is concrete, specialized and regionalized, adapted to particular objectives and particular
contexts. Further, the elaboration and application of the law flows from
the consensus of all the various actors involved, and not merely of
States.
The success of a specialized response lends credence to the idea of a
purely instrumental conception of internationalism, where international
law is merely a vehicle for the interests of certain groups of actors in
international society. This has prompted some to assume that international rules have become irreversibly dispersed or pluralized. However,
while it is true that international law has acquired an instrumental and
systemic function, it is not limited to this function. International law has
thus far not become entirely instrumental. Research into the constitutionalization and unification of international law as well as the idea of
communal law remains relevant as an analytical instrument, on the condition that such research is not taken to provide fail-safe and all-inclusive
descriptions of reality. Not only do they reflect a certain regulatory ideal
inherent in internationalist mentality, but they also find confirmation in
pragmatist research into the positivist elements of common and unifying
principles. 43 A universalizing approach to certain principles of interna-
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tional law is quite defensible, as is the underlying ideological dimension,
since the aim of universalization is the "sharing of a wider sense.'"'
How can the dispersion of rules and the emergence of common principles be explained? They can be explained on the basis that the two
phenomena are inextricably linked. It was the adoption of substantive
principles in 1945 that led to the incredible extension of international
law, and thus to its increasingly technical nature, its specialization and its
fragmentation. Law is subject to division, proliferation, and segmentation as a result of our interventionist, humanist, and welfare-inducing
objectives, because it is serving finalities that are substantive-and
which do not cease to proliferate-as well as purely formal. As has been
pointed out by Christopher L. Tomlins, 5 international law is thus subject
to the same discrepancy that afflicts many highly legalistic domestic societies, in which law is torn between its social (and instrumental)
function and its normative (and universal)
function, between specific
46
interests and autonomy or universality.
International law's interventionist and welfare-inducing pan-legalism
can be explained by a "turn for the ethical" that commenced before 1945
and continued until the 1990s. The 1990s and the modern world's shift
toward globalization transported the issue to a practical level and rendered more visible a process which had been ongoing for a long time.
International society's pan-legalism is thus linked to very deep-seated
ethics that are social (solidarity), biological (life), and liberal (liberty).
These ethics were inscribed in the Charter, but only really became a
striking source of difficulty since the 1990s and the end of the Cold War.
The law has since developed in a double manner. It is now made up
of social subsystems with specific legal regulatory needs, and produces
specific rules that are regional and flexible. It also finds expression in
values that are considered fundamental and communal, and in the enunciation and internationalization of these principles. International law is not
only an instrument for regional, categorical or specialized interests, but it
can also transport and impose, or be considered to transport and impose,
the fundamental ethical values of international politics as affirmed in the
Charter. Refusal to take these communal finalities into account and insistence on classical positivism or relativist deconstructivism does not seem
44.
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See Christopher L. Tomlins, Framing the Fieldof Law's DisciplinaryEncounters: A
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realistic, as Pierre-Marie Dupuy has explained.47 Of course, as indicated,
the law of 1945 is more prone to conflict because it is substantive. But
this should not lead us to ignore its ethical and communal dimension,
despite the fact that it generates many more conflicts than simple formal
law does. This is subject to much greater criticism, attack, and denunciation when attached to substantive principles than when attached to the
formal rules of creation and application. 48 Again, this is normal, as this
finality and these common values are not beyond all doubt, but uncertain
and provisory elements of our substantive law, and therefore need to be
subject to permanent negotiation. But if one believes in the possibility of
making collective decisions, which may be uncertain and fragile and
which do not necessarily have to be hegemonic, this means that the decisions are communal and not individualist. 49 If the only logic to prevail in
our internationalist world were the instrumentalist logic, this would
mean that international law has really become a simple "tool-box" at the
service of predominant interests. That would imply what has been
termed an "eclipsing of aims" and a triumph of instrumental reasoning to
the benefit of specific interests and a "disenchantment of international
law."
Yet this is not the case of contemporary law. The law here sometimes
acts as a "stopcock" for instrumentalist notions. Take a well-known and
controversial example of a fundamental and communal legal limit established by international law: resistance of the commercialization of the
value of health protection. Medicinal drugs are commercial items that
are sold and bought, but that is no reason to transform health protection
itself into a commercial item. ° It is only logical and indeed necessary
that pharmaceutical corporations protect their interests. We owe the
availability of new drugs to the laws of the marketplace, which favor free
competition. However, millions lack access to the drugs they need because access to generic drugs in not authorized. It is therefore up to
international politics to take charge of this issue, not with a view to abolishing the free market that has made these drugs available to us, but to
putting legal limits on the adverse effects on community needs. What is
required is a compromise between the pharmaceutical industry and the
right to medical treatment and health protection, a fundamental legal
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value established by international law. Andr6 Comte-Sponville"' emphasised that even though the marketplace and corporations may be best at
generating wealth and good products, one must realize that they are not
necessarily good at creating justice. That is not their role. Only States
and other subjects of international law are capable of achieving this by
subjecting the laws of the marketplace to certain fundamental legal limits.
D. New Power-Related Challenges
The global political balance is being subtly modified by the effects
of contemporary international law. Legal interventionism is giving rise to
new power-related challenges in domestic systems as well as in international society. It is bringing about new political balances. One would be
mistaken to think that this extension of law coincides with a phenomenon of a limitation of power, since, on the contrary, it implies a
strengthening of the grip of power on international and domestic social
life. The expansion of law corresponds to an increase in the activities of
its institutions, its bodies, its experts, its jurisdictions and international
actors, all of which apply and control international legal rules.
The role of legal professionals, experts, and civil servants has also
grown in importance. For example, the link between welfare-inducing
law and the existence of a growing bureaucracy has been apparent for a
long time.52 Once a bureaucracy is in place, its international character
leads it to use its power for its own enhancement and thus for the enhancement of interventionist law. International legal doctrine often
focuses on the importance of this growing bureaucracy, but in reality its
expansion may already have drawn to a close. The concurrent phenomena of regulation and governance that accompany the systematic and
functional international legal process lead to polycentric, negotiated regulation, which increasingly escapes the grip of governmental bodies and
thus stunts bureaucracy. 51 Can this not, for example, be said to be the case
of financial law, of international economic law, and of (international)
competition law?5 4 In fact, the two phenomena coexist, because as illustrated, they pursue the same aim, albeit by different means.
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The growth of interventionist international law coincides with the
establishment of roles for those who create and apply it, given that the
ongoing development of international legal rules in all areas of social life
is leading various powers to intervene in these areas in the name of
international law.55 Another consequence of this is the increasingly
important role played by international judges. Any society that is
increasingly subjected to the rule of law will experience the
"sanctification of the judge,"56 and a change in the role of the latter, since
judges are called upon increasingly often to resolve conflicts between
multiple rules, and are also becoming the international order's
"guardians of values. 57 But this extension of international law has also
brought about its revalorisation in the eyes of its various actors. Social
actors, States, minorities, individuals and indigenous peoples
increasingly tend to formulate their claims in terms of rights, while other
actors such as associations, trade unions, NGOs, international
organizations, and foreign government agencies are assisting them in
these legal formulations and obliging institutions to respect the relevant
rules in the most scrupulous way possible. Some of these institutions
include the IFHR, the HCR, the LawNet Center, the Institute for Human
Rights and Development in Africa, and the Southeast Asia Fund for
Institutional and Legal Development (SEAFILD). The aims of these
social actors are not solely to claim elementary rights, but to resolve
extremely complex legal situations that arise out of the actual domestic
application of rights. Law has thus become an instrument and means of
recourse in its own right when it comes to social, political, cultural,
economic, domestic, or international conflict. International law is
constantly resorted to as a means of combating arbitrariness and of
remedying weaknesses, imbalances, and injustices in international
society.
Yet although this increasingly important role of law can modify the
balance of political powers, it also puts into question the legitimacy of
the existing order. It can encourage support, but it can equally create resentment when welfare-inducing law fails to keep its promises.
International law's own expanse may undermine its effectiveness if expansion is not rooted in legitimacy and effectiveness. In 1945,
international law was considered the solution to the world's problems. In
2006, it may be a part of the problem. 8 But should the strength of inter55.
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national law "be measured on the basis of what it has already achieved
or in light of what it aims at?"'59

II. EFFECTIVENESS

AND LEGITIMACY

As international society moves away from being strictly liberal and
becomes welfare-inducing, international law is becoming increasingly
interventionist and ambitious in its aims and objectives. It has become
one of the most important structuring elements of international society.
Nonetheless, the expansionist and interventionist international law
model gives rise to a number of problems that are affecting its legitimacy
and causing some to question its effectiveness. Skeptics challenge:
Whatever happened to implementing the aims of the Millennium Declaration or of the Declarations on the Decade of International Law, on the
Elimination of Violence against Women, on the New International Economic Order? Whatever happened to the grandiose objective formulated
by the WHO in 1978 at Alma-Ata to ensure "health for all by the year
2000?" What about implementing the Kyoto Protocol, putting into operation the International Criminal Court, or fighting against poverty?
To ask these questions repeatedly implies condemnation of the gaping chasm that inevitably exists between law and reality. Nonetheless,
we should raise them while taking due account of recent developments.
Contemporary international law is characterized by a process of socialization of such wide amplitude that it cannot simply be perceived as a
simple avatar, a quick fix, or a solution to certain shortcomings of classical liberal law. It needs to be looked at as it is, in all its positive nature,
with its specificities and unique problems. 6° It should not be reduced to a
purely negative expression of a bio-competency, because it is also a positive instrument of solidarist regulation. The questions are thus: Where
are its limits? To which difficulties does it give rise?
A. The Difficulties of Welfare-Inducing Law

Contemporary law has been challenged on various levels. Overt interventionism in some social or economic areas may upset certain
delicate balances, or slow down necessary adaptations as a consequence
of the constraints or unacceptable rigidities it may imply. This is the case
of some policies applied to developing countries that have, in recent years,
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been critically re-evaluated. 6' There is also a distinct danger that the inflationary proliferation of rules will damage the law and create uncertainty as
to the boundary between law and non-law, which could in turn endanger
its crucial predictability and stability.
This correlates with Prosper Weil's observation that there is so much
soft law today that it is impossible to distinguish between the legal and
the illegal in international law.62 And even though one can, notwithstanding Mr. Weil's criticism, defend the idea of soft law, it is certainly not
without its difficulties. The proliferation of rules of all sorts is harming
the credibility of those rules. Law has started to "produce uncertainty,"
and is becoming difficult to discern. The result is dangerous opacity. International law is running the risk of becoming lost from the view of the
ordinary citizens who are precisely the regulatory object of international
law. They stand bewildered before an incomprehensible body of international regulation, perceived by some as being oppressive. The ever-more
invasive presence of international law in domestic systems is considered
legal imperialism in certain parts of the world, as it is the result of a
situation of inegalitarian coercion in which international agreement on
rules is pure faqade.
Public opinion often weighs heavily on foreign policy. But the question of the perception of international law affects new as well as older
international actors, including the States themselves. There may be a
shared sentiment of incapacity when it comes to dealing with the proliferation of rules that define the finalities of contemporary international
law. This may favor the role of experts, of legal professionals such as
ourselves, but it is not commendable. It does not resolve the issue of perception or the inability of other actors-and at times even of the
professionals themselves-to access rules, and lends credence to the idea
that know-how has been confiscated by an elite. David Kennedy figures
among those who have shown that the predominant role of experts is
detrimental to political decision-making and to the law itself.63 The problem lies not so much in the elaboration or application of rules, but in the
fact that this elaboration and application relies on the "true knowledge"
of "priestly experts." The danger is that the latter will exercise unlimited
61.
This well-known criticism comes most notably from economists and is most often
directed at the famous SAPs (Structural Adjustment Programmes) imposed by lenders, the
World Bank and the IMF. See PIERRE RALLE & DOMINIQUE GUELLEC, LES NOUVELLES
THtORIES DE LA CROISSANCE (1995); Dani Rodrick, L'intigrationdans l'conomie mondiale
peut-elle se substituer 4 une stratigie de diveloppement, 1-2 REVUE D'ECONOMIE DU DEVELOPPEMENT 233, 237-38 (2001).
62.
See Prosper Weil, Vers une normativiti relative en droit international86 REVUE
GtNtRALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 5-47 (1982).
63.
See JOHN HATCHARD & AMANDA PERRY-KESSARIS, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT: FACING COMPLEXITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 17-26 (2003).
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social control based on the link between knowledge, power, and existing
rules.
Yet it does not stop there. Since law is omnipresent, it is also a lot
more vulnerable and subject to criticism, to defaults and shortcomings.
As it develops, it becomes more fragile. The more the law is applied to
different social, economic, ecological, ethical, and cultural areas, the
more its execution becomes inconsistent. Accordingly, the welfareinducing and bio-political aspect is not, at present, leading it to become
an instrument of total social control, but has simply made it cover so
many areas that it has become incapable of regulating them correctly.
For instance, the more numerous the conventions on women's rights,
journalists, child soldiers, etcetera, the greater the danger of ineffectiveness or non-execution. For example, the International Convention for the
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance was recently
adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 20, 2006, in response to increased kidnappings in countries such as Nepal, Chechnya
and Columbia. The Convention puts in place an important preventive and
protective regime, and categorizes forced disappearances as continuous
crimes. It also provides for the creation of a Committee Against Forced
Disappearances and for resort to the Secretary General of the United Nations.
There are currently several hundred international human rights instruments in existence. 64 Yet violations, circumvention of rules,
exceptions, and derogations are increasing proportionate to the multiplication of international legal rules. This corresponds to simple
mathematical logic, but the greater issue lies in the increased sentiment
of ineffectiveness and of false certainty as to the strength of the law. It is
not conducive to law or society to increase prohibitions in the area of
human rights when they are still far from enforceable. In fact, it weakens
law and society. To evoke another example, Article 25 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights provides that "everyone has the right to an
adequate standard of living." Article 11 of the 1966 International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights recognises "the fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger." The Vienna
Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted by the World Conference
on Human Rights in 1993, emphasises that extreme poverty and exclusion are incompatible with human dignity. Accordingly, the Copenhagen
Declaration on Social Development and the Programme of Action
64.
See UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION
[UNESCO], Droits de I'homme: les principaux instruments internationaux, 9tat au 31 mai
2004 (May 31, 2004) (preparedby Vladimir Volodin), available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/
images/0013/001377/137770m.pdf.
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adopted at the World Summit for Social Development in March 1995, the
World Summit on Sustainable Development, held at Johannesburg in September 2002, and the declaration adopted on the occasion of the tenth
anniversary of the World Summit for Social Development in February
2005 all reaffirmed that the fight against extreme poverty must remain an
utmost priority for the international community. The Millennium Development Goals formed part of the Millennium Declaration adopted by the
UN General Assembly in 2000. The resolutions on human rights and
extreme poverty adopted each year by the UN Human Rights Commission link the issue of extreme poverty to that of the indivisibility of
rights, and note the inability of the most impoverished to exercise civil
and political rights.
Despite these measures, extreme poverty remains a global challenge
that faces around 800 million individuals who survive on an income less
than one dollar a day.66 What is the use of international law? The phenomenon of pan-legalism, whereby more and more areas are being
subjected to and regulated by international law, is creating the dangerous
illusion that any problem can be solved by means of international regulation. Often ethical, social, or economic solutions are more appropriate.
Today, international law is overused and as a result its credibility has
suffered.
Contemporary law suffers from the same problem that afflicts the
welfare State: it attempts to accomplish unachievable ends. One of these
aims is to liberate international society "from want and from risk.' 67 The
desire to be free from risk and to enjoy security has already been addressed by classical international liberal law, which aims primarily at
order and stability. However, this desire has now acquired a new dimension. It encompasses the physical security of individuals; the prevention
65.
66.

The last resolution was passed on April 14, 2005.
See U.N. Conference on Trade & Development, Geneva, Switz., 2002 Economic

Development in

Africa From Adjustment to

Poverty Reduction: What

is New?,

UNCTAD/GDS/AFRICA/2 (2002) (observing that in the cases of 27 African countries that
applied poverty reduction strategies, after two decades of structural adjustment, poverty has
increased, growth is most often slow and erratic, rural crises have worsened and deindustrialisation has hampered growth perspectives). The 1990s saw a rapid decrease in the number of
people in the world living on less than a dollar per day, the number having gone from 1.3
billion in 1990 to 1.16 billion in 1999. See WORLD BANK,

WORLD

DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

2003 at 5. However, this progress has been achieved mainly in China and in India. In fact, the
number of people living in poverty has gone from 6 to 24 million in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, from 48 to 57 million in Latin America, from 5 to 6 million in the Middle East and
in Northern Africa, and from 241 to 315 million in Africa. Id. The report indicates that by
2015, if the current rhythm of economic growth is maintained, the number of people living in
extreme poverty will probably diminish in all regions of the world except sub-Saharan Africa,
in the Middle East and in North Africa, where projected growth rates are not sufficient to stem
the onslaught of poverty. Id.
67.
See ROSANVALLON,supra note 13, at 33-35.
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of major technological, epidemical and ecological disasters; compensation for natural catastrophes; the necessity to combat international
instability; and the current dangers of terrorism through collective action. These are legitimate expectations based on the notions of
interdependence and of the "involuntary community of risks," but their
achievement requires an exponential increase in the amount of legal interventions.
In addition to this first aim, there is another, entirely legitimate desire: to be free from want. 68 Contemporary welfare-inducing international
law strives to assure wellbeing and to satisfy needs in very concrete
ways, by remedying weaknesses in State action and through the guarantee of basic living conditions and to bring about economic and social
prosperity the world around. In this context, one notes that there is an
implicit and perhaps unconscious objective of exercising a biocompetency. 69
The limitless nature of this aim is all too apparent. Eliminating want
in order to ensure survival is an achievable aim, even if it requires determining the meaning of survival (which is a relative term) and
harnessing political goodwill. To improve the health of human beings is
also a measurable objective, although it has no real limit. Satisfying a
need for collective wellbeing in a more general way, though, is hardly
commensurable. 0 Similar issues arise when new risks of planetary proportions materialize, leading the pursuit of wellbeing to become
interwoven with a fight against large-scale risks and giving rise to the
same unlimited spiral. Combating civilizational risks "represents an
unlimited endeavour, insatiable, eternal, which auto-extends itself."7' As
for the need to achieve wellbeing, it too seems to be largely exponential
and auto-referential. The logic of welfare-inducing, interventionist international law, and priestly bio-competency, has given rise to an "always
more" logic that knows no bounds and that could undermine the law's
legitimacy due to its loss of efficiency, of sense, and of significance in
the eyes of the members of international society.7 2 The law is creating
novel expectations that are sometimes over-inflated and to which the law
is sometimes incapable of responding. The turn toward the ethical, taken
in conjunction with economic globalization, has undoubtedly reinforced
ROSANVALLON, supra note 13, at 34.
68.
69.
See FOUCAULT, NAISSANCE, supra note 16, at 323.
70.
See ROSANVALLON, supra note 13.
BECK, supra note 23, at 42; see BECK, supra note 23, at 103 ("[S]ociety in its en71.
tirety is determined by the risks it creates, and thus produces the very social conditions and the
political potential which can pose a threat to it and challenge the foundations of modernisation
as we know it.").
72.
BECK, supra note 23, at 38.
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the utopian idea of a welfare-inducing international law that is capable of
anything, since globalization has sparked the hope of new economic
prosperity. However, as Daniel Cohen has observed quite succinctly, the
main problem with globalization is that "it is not keeping its promises,"73
at least not for the moment.
One can hardly ignore its virtually mystifying aspect: the expectations that need to be satisfied by means of welfare-inducing law are
boundless, and the responses that are undertaken are unsatisfying. Welfare-inducing international law strives to bring wellbeing to populations,
but sometimes attempts to do this by treating them as regulated bodies
rather than as populations that are free to govern themselves. It is not
sufficiently shaped by the collective decision-making and deliberation
one usually finds in politically free collectives.
These observations should not be misunderstood. They seek neither
to conceal the positive aspects and successes of contemporary international law, nor to shed doubt on the necessity of the fights against
poverty, disease, and the suffering that millions of individuals in the
world confront. The aim is solely to draw attention to the difficulties that
attach to the welfare-inducing, bioethical, and interventionist finality of
this law, and to re-evaluate its possibilities. Is the purpose of its finality
merely to legitimise the existence of new powers? Or put differently: Is
the law's legitimacy not deeply affected by the partial ineffectiveness it
suffers from in certain areas? Could its application on the basis of a principle of exclusion or inclusion not harm it? Will judges, currently
"guardians of values," end up becoming the "final guardians of promises?, 74 And will the indefinite extension of international law lead to its
decline?
B. Conceptions of Effectiveness and Legitimacy
To briefly illustrate a current tendency: In March 2006, the general
directors of civil aviation of the member States of the ICAO decided to
publish the results of the organization's Universal Security Audit Programme (USAP) on its website. The objective was to evaluate to what
degree the application of the Organization's rules was effective, and to
identify their security defaults. A situation report is due to be presented
at the next ordinary session of the Assembly of the ICAO, in autumn
2007. 7' The subject is obviously of crucial importance, since terrorism in
73.
74.

DANIEL COHEN, LA MONDIALISATION ET SES ENNEMIS

256 (2004).

supra note 3.
75.
See Jacobo Rios Rodriguez, OACI Confirence des Directeurs gingraux de
I'aviation civile sur une stratigie mondiale pour la securitd de la navigation aerienne,
59 SENTINELLE (2006), available at http://www.sfdi.org/actualites/a2006/Sentinelle%
GARAPON,

2059.htm#oaci.
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international aviation is a grave threat to civilian security, and the audit
adopted by the ICAO, an organization founded in 1944, demonstrates a
current trend toward reinforcing the effectiveness of international legal
rules. In the present context, the question we should be interested in is to
what extent this current search for effectiveness is or is not connected to
the idea of legitimacy of international rules.
It would exceed the scope of this work to address all aspects of this
problem, and would require operating Thomas Franck's complex distinction between the different types of legitimacy that attach to various
situations or rules.76 Moreover, it is only natural that the debate on the
legitimacy of international institutions and rules persists. As mentioned
above, this is the result of international law having evolved into substantive law. In a decentralized international society such as ours, where
actors, activities, and interests are diverse and plentiful and where universal institutions are threatening to become unproductive by virtue of an
increase in tasks and administrative networks, no institution, group of
States, or even a global community of States can truly purport to incarnate the general interest of the international community.17 In a society
that possesses multiple networks in competition with one another, it is
unavoidable that various legitimacies should exist, given the parallel proliferation of the principles and instances of legitimacy.
That said, it appears necessary to emphasise that the question of the
legitimacy of contemporary international law is subject to a double inflection of paradoxical nature. Discourse on the legitimacy of rules has
now acquired dual character.
On the one hand, there is a claim to absolute legitimacy, to "value"
legitimacy as M. Weber would say. The set of common values that has
not been in doubt and that represents a tenet of modern-day international
law possesses an aura of legitimacy some would not dare put in question.
On the contrary, others subject it to the most rigorous scrutiny. What
comes to mind are human rights and democracy. These rights are a priori immune to utilitaristic discourse because they represent an interest in
their own right that cannot be of utilitaristic nature. Even though extending
their benefit to everyone ensures a minimum of wellbeing for everyone,
their value is above all deemed to be intrinsic, whereby they cannot be
sacrificed to utilitaristic ends. Legal practice in this respect is among the
most contentious of modem times since it concerns one of the most fundamental aspects of the new "togetherness" of international society. Most
76.
See THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS
25-46 (1995).
77.
See geneially Nathaniel Berman, Passions et ambivalences: le colonialisme, le nationalisme et le droit international (forthcoming May 2008), with introductionby Emmanuelle
Jouannet.
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of the current major conflicts, domestic as well as international, feed off
this discourse or directly integrate it, regardless of the position that is
ultimately taken.
Human rights were thus invoked to justify colonization as well as
decolonization." Yet rather than lapsing into easy criticism, one must
never cease to inquire into their legitimacy. Human rights are illustrative
of a type of legal discourse that is hardly susceptible to criticism,7 9 since
it claims absolute "value" legitimacy. There are certain immediate consequences: to delay the application of these rights is to deal with the
devil. The absolute value that human rights tend to be accorded sometimes renders doubt "criminal. 8 0 These present words may trigger
outcries, cause indignation, and give rise to reproach, as certain situations really are intolerable. Moreover, it is often observed that those who
contest human rights are those who violate them for their own benefit.
For example, Burma's Aung Sang Suu Ky does not defend a western
conception of liberty. Similarly, even Rigoberta Menchu who works for
the cause of the rights of indigenous peoples does not defend this concept.8 ' Many lawyers assert that human rights are, first and foremost, a
legal category and not an ideology or religion, and that these rights need
to be dissociated from their moral dimension as well as from ideological
manipulation. Though this is a fundamental point, one should not forget
their general ethical value, considering that this ethical nature produces
effects that would not be explicable otherwise. The ethical value of
rights does not seem to be dissociable from their legal status, which is
why they remain subject to certain limitations, and always will be. In
addition, by reason of the underlying ethical status of rights, they are
ever more often accorded the role of transcendent collective landmarks
within an international society that actually de-sanctified itself long ago.
Contemporary international society takes on the civilized role of classical society by soliciting the symbolic function of rights much in the
same way modern western democracies have.
78.
There was, in fact, an indirect link between the civilisatory mission and human
rights as recognised by domestic law. See, e.g., Jules Ferry, Address to the French Chamber of
Deputies (July 9, 1885) (explaining that "the declaration of human rights was not written for
the benefit of the blacks of Equatorial Guinea," although there did exist a "duty on the part of
superior races to colonise inferior races" in order to civilise them and render them capable of
benefiting from human rights).
79.
It is actually the humanitarian world itself that subjects human rights to the most
thorough scrutiny, scrutiny which is often more thorough than that which comes from external
observers; and this has been confirmed by many a study published in recent years by professionals, jurists, human rights activists or humanitarian activists.
80.
GAUCHET, supra note 30, at 357.
81.
Rigoberta Menchu, LA CROIX (I998)("The 1948 Declaration does not proclaim any
identity rights for my indigenous brothers from Guatemala, which is why we must opt for a
multicultural perception of human rights.").
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Legal discourse sometimes risks becoming absolute and ethicaland not truly legal-thereby introducing a dangerous moral utopia based
on a veritable sanctification of rights. Is it not obvious that very often
when we speak of rights, we are actually referring to values of international society? But from where does the idea of the value of rights derive
if not from their ethical and symbolic dimension, which remains unaffected by their legal status? This is precisely the reason why they create
a sense of "value" legitimacy. As a result, international moral discourse
has become inflated, particularly with respect to human rights. This
might be explained by the fact that the line of divide between the new
substantive law and ethical values is quite permeable, but this fact is regrettable to the extent that it favors politics over law and is not based on
a real criterion of effectiveness. This generates political behaviour that
is overly based on novel expectations and on international discourse that
addresses intentions rather than consequences. Politicians, international
civil servants, and heads of State are developing a tactical compensatory
attitude that inevitably generates an over-investment in rights that is sure
to disappoint in the long run. It may even have devastating effects when
it comes a lack of concrete consequences.
The end result of all of this is incomprehension, deep frustration
with and discredit of human rights; in other words, de-legitimisation.
What is presented as universal can actually be perceived as the imperialism of virtue, much criticized by Yves Dezalay and Bryant G. Garth.83
Human rights can also be re-appropriated and profoundly distorted precisely by those accused of having violated them. For example, Fidel
Castro proclaimed "human rights, that's me," and Mouammar Khadafi
created the Khadafi human rights prize. These two examples of caricatural distortion actually illustrate that human rights have no value in those
two respective countries. And notwithstanding the atrociousness of the
political manipulations of various dictators, this is the core of the problem. In fact, it is important to recall what Claude Levi-Strauss intended
to show in Tristes tropquesm with regard to tools: a society, a domestic
82.
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imperialism).
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See CLAUDE L9VI-STRAUSS, TRISTES TROPIQUES 172 (1955).
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community, an ethnic group, or a tribe cannot truly integrate tools if it
has not sincerely embraced them as a value; if it has not, it will leave
them to wither rather than integrate them. The same is true of modernday human rights. The point is easily missed when their value is masked
by a representation of their nature in purely legal terms. Whereas the
abstract character of rights poses no problem, the difficulty lies in the
values they express, and in the fact that they cannot truly function unless
they are valorized by those to whom they are to be applied. All that is not
perceived as a value belonging to a group will be rejected and subverted
by the latter. We thus see international law as the scene of a parody in
which principles are declared universal while being subjected to ironic
reproduction and complete de-legitimisation. This "mock realism," as
Nathaniel Berman has shown, is the twisted consequence of the apparent
appropriation of legal principles labelled "common" by all, but which
have not truly been "embraced" by certain cultures and States. Herein
lies a trap: It is difficult to condemn this parody "without contradicting
oneself," as it is not an issue of principles of a system being replaced by
other principles, but of manipulation of mainstream rhetoric with the aim
of destabilizing it from within.85
Interventionist and sectored substantive law is prompting a general
transformation of its own legitimacy, paradoxically moving away from
value legitimacy and instead focusing directly on the issue of effectiveness.8 6 The disorderly and fragmented global expansion of international
legal rules leads some to doubt that rules can be legitimate merely by
virtue of their legal status. The effectiveness of law is therefore becoming a "cause of legitimacy and cause for its caution," due to the profound
transformation of legal rationale into instrumental and functionalist rationale. International rules, elaborated with the aim of attaining a
specific social result, are expected to bring about precise and effective
results. It is no longer a framework for conduct based on a general, ideal
state of affairs to which States must adhere, but an instrument for the
implementation of international politics aimed at achieving economic,
social or sanitary objectives. At the same time, legitimacy no longer
flows from the mere legality of a rule or from the values it incarnates,
but actually from its effectiveness. This reflects onto the entire international legal system. Formerly, international law and the United Nations
enjoyed what could be termed a presumption of legitimacy, a principled
legitimacy that derived from the fact that they were at the service of
85.
See generally Nathaniel Berman, Beyond Colonialism and Nationalism? Ethiopia,
Czechoslovakia, and "Peaceful Change," 65 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 421, 421-79 (1996) (providing a different context for Berman's analytical methods).
86.
See CHEVALLIER, supra note 40, at 90.
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States and the international community. Today, the new functionalist
logic and repeated systemic crises have caused a crisis of legal legitimacy, and international law and its institutions must first demonstrate
their effectiveness before being deemed legitimate and adhered to. Law
is judged on the basis of its results, and no longer on the basis of the
consensus that enabled its elaboration.
Legitimacy is no longer "acquired" as it was in the context of the
post-1945 consensus, but must be "conquered."" This is a result of the
influence of Anglo-Saxon pragmatism and realism, since the ideal that
dominated the continental view for a long time was that a legally protected general interest could not be measured in terms of effectiveness."
Legal idealism is gradually being superseded by the necessity of coherent, rational, and socially useful legal practice. The rule of justice is thus
defined by a criterion of effectiveness. Equality, for example, is no
longer legitimized by its simple abstract proclamation, which, precious
as it may be, has frequently been criticized as hollow and ineffective.
The new logic of equality that was set in motion by the New International Economic Order but that is present in other areas such as that of
the environment, labor standards, and even economic law, now takes into
account the situation of inequality between individuals, peoples, or
States. The underlying idea used by international society as a point of
orientation is not necessarily equality, but inequality. Justice and the legitimacy of rules are not as much perceived in terms of the equality they
may proclaim, but as techniques based on inequality, positive discrimination, correction, and adaptation. Correspondingly, the new concept of
equality is no longer a limit to power, but an interventionist tool requiring an assessment of its effectiveness. The principle of equality does, of
course, remain, but the issue has shifted in the sense that all are equal but
different. The legitimacy/effectiveness dichotomy is thus inversed, as the
legitimacy of the legal principle of equality depends on its effectiveness
in taking into account these differences. Article 3 of the 1992 United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change is an explicit example of this subtle inversion that inevitably gives rise to tension. The
Convention requires states to "protect the climate system for the benefit
of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity
and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities
and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties
should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects
thereof."

87.
88.

CHEVALLIER, supra note 40, 64.
CHEVALLIER, supra note 40, at 63.
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The incorporation of effectiveness into the sphere of legitimacy has
positive, but also certain negative effects. It requires taking account of
the value of institutions and projects, evaluating the consequences of
legal rules and acts, generating further initiatives and responsibilities,
and going beyond mere lip service to law. It is an evaluative concept that
concentrates on the reception and implementation of legal rules. It thus
has an essentially critical function. It also raises some serious questions.
First, values are increasingly placed on the slippery slope of purely
economic rationale. A strictly economic approach to law is dangerous
when it transforms law into a consumer item or when it makes economic
rationale the sole criterion for evaluating the efficiency of international
rules and institutions. 9 It also ignores that legal rationale must be distinguished from economic rationale. Secondly, it is somewhat pernicious to
consider that only the rules that are applied effectively and efficiently
should be legal, since linking the existence of legal rules to the concrete
effectiveness would render them malleable, uncertain, and unpredictable. 90 Law contains safeguards that cannot always be respected, since
"the fate of law is to remain partially ineffective."9' In addition, the different levels of application of international law and its segmentation into
subsystems are subject to differing imperatives. The concept of effectiveness is evidently not the same regarding the general functioning of
the system as it is when it comes to evaluating a commercial contract or
investment. The effectiveness of rules differs depending on the contexts
and ends to which those rules aspire. It can come into play in a context
of instrumentality as well as in a context of symbolism. A rule can be
adopted "either in order to modify a given state of affairs and to achieve
a specific aim (instrumentality), or to affirm some other (symbolic or
unexpressed) finality, the attainment of which is not, however, truly desired. 92 In this vein, can the International Criminal Court be appreciated
merely in cost-benefit or efficiency terms? Should it not be appreciated
in light of the desire to set up an international instance of criminal justice
and to put an end to the impunity of heads of State? As has been emphasised by Mireille Delmas-Marty, given its universal nature, the Court
reflects a sense that corresponds to that of no other mixed, international,
temporary, or domestic jurisdiction, and "it is by sanctioning prohibited

89.
Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics Movement, 77 AM. ECON. REV. I
(1996), Ejan Mackaay, La rtgle juridique observie par le prisme de li'conomiste: Une histoire stylisge du mouvement d'analyse 9conomique du droit, I REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE
DROIT ECONOMIQUE 43 (1986).
90.
DENYS DE BtCHILLON, Qu'est-ce qu'une r~gle de Droit? 62 (1997).
91.
Id. at 61.
92.
DELMAS-MARTY, supra note 9, at 170-71.
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action that a community constructs its common identity and memory."93
Thirdly, the danger inherent in the logic of effectiveness is that it will
lead to a situation where the means are given disproportionate importance and are not sufficiently coupled with goals; where the focus will be
on the means, to the detriment of the aims.
Finally, there is a risk of creating a situation that is diametrically opposed to the aims of "value" legitimacy, such as human rights. In both
cases there is a problematic relationship between the law and the facts,
and between the law and morality. There will always be a wide gap between legal rules and reality. Yet to think the opposite, to think that it
will henceforth be possible to implement any legal principle, that doubt
is not acceptable, that the distance between law and the facts can be
eliminated, be it by virtue of an absolute legitimacy or by virtue of a
drive for maximum effectiveness, has negative consequences for the law
itself.
III. PROSPECTS?

We have thus far retraced the trodden path, but it appears that the
price to pay for previous developments may actually turn out to be heavier than previously assumed. Although international law has never before
been as expansive as at present, it is also going through a period of contestation and loss of legitimacy as well as effectiveness. This is not to
regret the developments that have taken place, but to remain vigilant as
to the social effects they may produce. It also leads us back to the question of the aims of international law and its capacity to fulfil them, and to
the question of contemporary attitudes pertaining to the general view
that I have put forward here.
It now seems impossible to turn back from the present course. To
deny the new aims of contemporary law and to press for a return to
minimalist liberal law would be to allow the neo-liberal powers that be
to exploit the downfall of the international system for their own advantage. 94 Under no circumstance should we succumb to the ultraliberal
refusal to tackle mutual problems in the way welfare-inducing law does,
as the latter would thus become a regrettable avatar of classical liberal
law. It is not, however, surprising that there is currently a resurgence, in
93.
DELMAS-MARTY, supra note 9, at 193.
94.
This interventionist expansion of international law has been subjected to a twofold
critique which I do not partake in: managerial critique combined with neo-liberal critique of the
Hayekian type. The first type of critique emphasises that the inflation of rules is prejudicial to the
freedom of public agents and private operators, and that the contractualisation of international
law would be better way of adapting it to globalization. This critique is supplemented by the
ultraliberal critique which criticises any type of interventionism in the free global economy.
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international law, of the old debate between ultraliberals, who express
discontentment with too much law and bureaucracy, and moderate liberals, whose sole intent is to reform the system. Yet restoring the image of
a classical but incentive-creating system would be inconsistent with the
profound socio-cultural changes the contemporary international system
has undergone, and with the legitimate aspirations held by millions of
individuals, is therefore not an option either.
The shift toward ethical and functionalist welfare-inducing law is the
product of a redefinition of politics and of the fabric of international society itself, and is accompanying the evolution of this society and
structuring it accordingly. Classical society and liberal international law
were based on international politics as defined solely by States. Contemporary welfare-inducing society presupposes that political power must
aim at fostering communal wellbeing around the planet. But the 1945
consensus deteriorated long ago, as it was borne out of exceptional circumstances. It now needs to be reconstituted in the context of the new
society. The legal values and objectives contemporary international law
aspires to correspond to political priorities and certainly do not flow
from a universal consciousness. They are the result of choices that were
quite understandable in 1945, but that now need to be reformulated or
revoked outright, as even if the same objectives undoubtedly still remain,
the modalities have changed and the circle of addressees has become
considerably larger.95 Some have represented current phenomena in the
international system as the result of a "crisis of authority" related to a
double crisis of State sovereignty and of territoriality. 96 This is deemed to
explain the inability of international law to regulate the current disorder
and to create a stable order. However, just as one refers to a "global inversion" to describe the diminishing of sovereignties faced with
emancipated groups and individuals, one could equally refer to an "inversion of international law" since this law is increasingly restraining
States and empowering individuals, minorities, and peoples through the
recognition of rights. This approach is said to be based on "the actor getting his own back on the system. 97 States are no longer the sole
members, actors, and subjects of international society, and individuals
and NGOs are now seeking recognition under international law. Today,
there are hundreds of international organizations, thousands of NGOsincluding 2,719 with ECOSOC status-and hundreds of multinationals
95.
See generally Richard Falk, Positive Prescriptionsfor the Near Future: A World
Order Perspective, 20 PRINCETON CENTER FOR INT'L STUD. WORLD ORD. STUD. PROGRAM
OCCASIONAL PAPERS 1 (1991) (providing an exhaustive analysis of these changes).
96.
See BERTRAND BADIE & MARIE-CLAUDE SMOUTS, LE RETOURNEMENT DU MONDE
125-35 (1992).
Id. at 240.
97.
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thriving in the 208 States and territories. These are the entities with
which States, international organizations, and international politicians
interact,98 which is why political cohesion and the legitimacy of the existing system require that all actors adhere to shared values.99 All could be
different if there were greater consciousness of the fact that a legal system can be used beneficially and not simply endured passively. That
being said, one should not minimize the role played by States, and
should acknowledge the amicable concurrence of interstatists and cosmopolitans, voluntarists, and communitarians.
This is not to put in question the principle of interventionist welfareinducing law, but rather to question its functioning and the limits to
which it should be subject. This may appear surprising and perhaps even
shocking considering the sociological state of the planet with all its inequalities and injustices, where collective and individual suffering has
never been as dramatic and devastating. The neo-Marxist economists
Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein have illustrated how major
conflicts of interest, monopolist and exclusionary phenomena, and the
unequal development of powers have persisted due to an excess of unequal resistance from the periphery.' °° But this is precisely what has
prompted the present essay, since the solution might actually lie in subjecting law to certain limits. International law may be "part of the
problem," but it is also, as has been emphasised by Philippe Sands,'0 ' "part
of the solution," so long as possible options do not go to the detriment of
social or political processes or the will of the State. Without returning to
classical minimalist law, we need to fight the preconception that reducing
law is equivalent to regression, and that any limitation on sovereignty is a
victory. How far should international law go in accomplishing its aims? Is
it the miracle solution to all of the world's problems?
The answer is obviously no. Law is not a universal panacea. Politics
determine international law, even if sometimes they appear to ignore it.
Any discourse that glorifies international law and its virtues is usually
98.
See Pascal Lamy, Director General, WTO, Keynote Speech to the 23rd Assembly of
the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Associations (Oct. 11,
2006) ("We must acknowledge, too, that the public is holding their governments to account for
the expectations that globalization has raised on a much wider scale-that an increasingly
wealthy and prosperous world should be making faster progress toward broadly-based economic development, reducing poverty, particularly in its most extreme forms, and achieving
international social and environmental goals.").
99.
Franqois Rigaux, La dimension normative des concepts de peuples et d'ttat dans
l'ordre juridique international,in L'THIQUE DE L'ESPACE POLITIQUE MONDIAL 33 (KlausGerd Giesen ed., 1997).
100.
ETIENNE BALIBAR & IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, RACE, NATION, CLASSE: LES IDENTITES AMBIGUES 13 (1998).
101.
See generally PHILIPPE SANDS, LAWLESS WORLD: AMERICA AND THE MAKING AND
BREAKING OF GLOBAL RULES (2005).
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accompanied by criticism of its weaknesses and perverse effects. This
anthropomorphic vision of international law has the aim of turning it
into a being in its own right that can be conveniently accused of defaults
that are in fact those of the entities that created it, i.e. principally States,
politicians, international experts such as us international jurists, but also
those who would like to appropriate international law, such as NGOs,
lobbies, individuals/associations, think tanks, and multinational corporations, which undoubtedly exercise political power despite hesitating to
acknowledge it openly. This anthropomorphic vision ,needs to be rejected
so that everyone can be allocated their proper role and usefulness. In
fact, the present situation is interesting in that it reveals the functioning
of western political modernity and its tendency to isolate the legal dimension in order to attribute an exclusive and exorbitant role to it. Yet
the difficulties and tensions that have resulted illustrate the necessity of
re-evaluating the two other dimensions to which international law is fundamentally connected: the political and the social. No doubt it is
therefore necessary to search for a better balance, or more precisely, to
be more conscious of the political and social dimensions that are concealed behind the law, and which are masked by the heightened role of
all that is legal. They no longer have the same mobilizing effect they
used to have, at least less than is the case of, say, legal discourse on human rights. Law does not actually provide a response to all problems,
even if law is now omnipresent. In fact, the merit of contemporary deconstructivist critique is to have deconstructed the illusion of complete
legal emancipation and to have attempted to rehabilitate all that is purely
political in the elaboration, interpretation, and application of rules; and it
is undoubtedly this critique that will enable us to accept that internacan regain strength as a political means of regulating
tional law
02
conduct.°
What thus takes place behind the smokescreen of welfare-inducing
law is a political game of inclusion and exclusion. Why has poverty not
been eliminated as proclaimed? Is it because law has remained ineffective and impotent when faced with international reality? Or is it merely a
tree concealing a forest of international renouncement? Reducing world
poverty is a commensurable challenge and therefore a realizable objective, but it will not be possible as long as States and other actors have not
set themselves truly fundamental and overriding aims for the benefit of
the planet, as well as for their own domestic systems. "Poverty is an invention of civilisation,"'' 0 3 and it is on the latter that its eradication will
depend. Studies on the phenomenon of poverty are very interesting in
102.
103.

See BOURETZ, supra note 59, at 14.
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this respect, because they show that at a given moment in the development of a society, poverty always calls for collective action (and not
individual acts of charity). No sooner are substantial amounts of property
constituted that give rise to inequalities and merciless confrontation between the rich and the poor, do "asymmetrical dependencies" appear as
the most frequent result.' °4 The possible defaults and dysfunctions of
welfare-inducing law should not mask political deferral and inaction at
the domestic and international levels, or the fact that international law
has always been used in a profoundly ambiguous way: as a positive
model of inclusion and simultaneously as a negative model of exclusion,
as a positive model of cooperation yet also as a negative model of domination. The somewhat paradoxical yet inescapable fact is that welfareinducing law is, as we have seen, easier to instrumentalize than strictly
liberal law aimed at regulating conduct, and is thus, ironically, less social
and more unjust. It can be used to accelerate necessary corrections to
gaping inequalities between nations or between individuals, but can also
enable superpowers and economic operators to increase their revenue
and importance. Furthermore, it can be conveniently denounced by the
most virulent dictatorships in underdeveloped countries on the basis that
it is inefficient. It can also be used as a means of obtaining international
aid, despite the fact that the sharp rise in poverty and famine over recent
years has actually been due to negligence, blind collectivism, terror, or
civil war. 105
Here, legal interventionist and welfare-orientated discourse can be a
vector of domestic or international domination, much like a powerful
lever of transformation. It should also be noted that strictly legal discourse will not tell us why things are as they are and which might be the
best way to change them. That is not its role, and it is therefore not a
problem if law does not trump other types of discourse. Law has, however, become so entrenched in international society that the latter can no
longer be conceptualized independently of it. Although it has undoubtedly always been an instrument of international social and political
action, law has never played as important a role as it does today. International legal problems are no longer external problems one can simply
resolve by calling international State conferences; they have become internalized by all societies, and we are gradually losing our ability to
distance ourselves from them, and indeed from law itself. Yet distinguishing roles and finalities is all the more difficult when law is not in

104.
105.
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itself capable of effectuating change and remains dependent on politics
and adaptation.
The debate on the ability of politics to bring about change on an international level is as old as international society itself, and its current
prevalence indicates its re-emergence. Although many analysts have
taken neo-realist, neo-institutionalist, neo-functionalist, globalizationist,
or transnationalist positions on this issue,' °6 the present trend emphasises
that the scope for manoeuvre of "real international politics" is limited
due to the rise in bureaucracy, corporate interest groups, legalism in international relations, transnational networks of private actors, the
incapacities of fragile States, etc., as if there existed within a decentralized society (which, however, has never been centralized and thus cannot
be decentralized) a sort of political center-point providing a measure of
the effectiveness or legitimacy of international political action," 7 when in
reality the concepts most often evoked-namely collective State action,
"international regimes," or global governance -actually only recentralize politics in different manners. '°9 Should we perhaps nuance the idea of
an international political "center" or "system," either pessimistically by
reference to a new Middle Age,"0 or more optimistically by emphasizing
the importance of the individual's new role as an international actor,"'
the emergence of networks, or of orderly pluralism," 2 in order to enlarge
our perspective on politics and better understand it? In fact, the increasing relevance of international law is not putting limitations on power, but
bringing about a reorganization of power. The impression of reduced
political leeway is thus deceptive, since in fact, new political powers are
emerging that involve decisions affecting people and their environment.
The sensation of political powerlessness or of simulacrum derives from
106.
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the fact that politics are reduced to the activities carried out within the
official international political system." 3
However, whatever is the actual scale of these illusions and developments, they have instilled a sense of unease in internationalist culture,
which is necessarily political as well as legal given the indissoluble links
between the two. This is the result of the latent but visible state of disequilibrium between the official appearance of the classical center-points
of political power-States, international organizations, etc.-where official activities appear efficient and regulatory, but often fall short of
attaining the fixed objectives, and an international society that is inexorably straying from official political decisions and introducing new
actors with new objectives, decision-making competencies, and political
dimensions. That is not to say that States and international organizations
are not the prime institutional actors on the international scene, but simply that behind the unchanged fagade of the politics they engage in, new
political centre-points are taking shape. Consequently, the boundary between the political and the non-political is becoming ever more
indeterminate, just as the boundary between the legal and the non-legal.
To paraphrase Prosper Weil, one can say that politics, much as the law,
have become "diluted." The categories of the political and the nonpolitical, as well as those of the legal and non-legal, must be reconceptualized with a view to redefining political priorities and redefining them collectively, to the extent that this is possible. How can
welfare-inducing law prevail without a strong and interventionist political center-point to ensure its application as the European States did in
the post-war period from the fifties to seventies? How can one reconcile
the changes in the law and international politics? Is not what initially
seemed paradoxical but explicable becoming completely contradictory?
In any case, there is little point in pinning all our hopes on politics.
Welfare does not seem to be induced by politics, by the law or by the
State, although we have not altogether reached a dead point. '4 International politics does not define man's happiness, but rather it regulates the
conduct of domestic and international actors, combats misery, and prevents risks.
We are thus subjected to a continuing process of transformation that
has become the very logic of contemporary liberal welfare-inducing law
and its contiguous political developments. The new aims of contemporary
law are associated with a strong utopia, a promise that something might be
achieved by international law that has not been achieved by domestic law:
that everyone may determine their own destiny; that social, economic, or
113.
114.
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cultural identity does not have to persist within a permanent social situation. The focus is less on the impossibility of equality than on the
creation of conditions required for changing situations. But law cannot,
by itself, replace social connections, States, morality and ethics, all
which must play their roles. It cannot replace politics, and it cannot, by
itself, remedy economic inequalities, the sense of insecurity that flows
from global ecological and sanitary risks, or the problems related to cultural identity or poverty. It can even end up slowing down the social and
political drive by standardizing conduct or, conversely, by creating promises it cannot keep. Even if the law were capable of complete
effectiveness, would it really be desirable to have a policed international
society that exercises diffuse "priestly global bio-competencies" in order
to bestow billions of individuals with "policed" physical and moral
health? Without lapsing into a phobia of social control such as described
by Michel Foucault in his time, the question is worth asking.
We are going through a rather particular period that leads us to reflect on the legitimacy and effectiveness of the international system. Has
it fully deployed its effects? Can improving its effectiveness help change
mentalities? Or must we attempt to redefine its finalities? Do we really
understand the foundations upon which international society currently
rests and the instruments it requires? Which rules do we really want?
How do they work? What purpose should international law serve?
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